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1The Eﬀects of Market Structure on Industry
Growth
Abstract
We study the behavior of ﬁrms in an imperfectly competitive environment in which ﬁrms
inﬂuence the evolution of the stock of capital equipment. Our model enables us, using
analytical characterizations, to show the eﬀect of key ingredients of dynamic competition
on ﬁrm strategies and industry dynamics in addition to the usual static interaction. These
eﬀects are the static market externality (implicit in the static Cournot Equilibrium) as well
as the dynamic market externality due to the eﬀect on the market outputs of a capital stock
and a dynamic externality that stems from the competition between ﬁrms for the capital
stock. These strategic elements justify our conclusions, based on the study of four market
structures, for the link between industrial organization and industry growth.
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21. Introduction
The role of capital deepening on economic growth is usually studied through highly aggre-
gated growth models. In these models, typically focusing on the macroeconomy, perfect
competition is the prevailing market structure. On the other hand, the eﬀects of capital
deepening on the growth of smaller markets, like industries, are very important, and these
eﬀects are not generally driven by mechanisms of perfectly competitive capital markets.
Capital is one of the major inputs for the production of output by a ﬁrm. Unlike in
static environments, when capital evolves over time, the organization of the intermediate
good market, the capital market, also plays a major role in industry dynamics. Firms often
operate in an imperfectly competitive environment for capital, and thus must take account
of the market mechanism behind the dynamics of the capital stock in making their output
decision. The determinants of output strategies by ﬁrms in such an imperfectly competitive
dynamic environment, are hardly ever studied or poorly understood.
Unlike in aggregate models that focus on a single aggregated type of capital, ﬁrms in
each speciﬁc industry use speciﬁc equipment. When it is important to study the sectoral
growth of certain industries, aggregation is a rather oversimplifying assumption.
The dynamics of capital, especially ﬁrm speciﬁc capital, is indispensable for studying
the dynamic organizations of industry. There are capital structures that are speciﬁc to
industries, especially in the way that they aﬀect the dynamics. More output means more
speciﬁc equipment utilization, which leads, in turn, to higher depreciation of this equipment.
Pipe lines and transmission grids, shared research eﬀorts and the exploitation of natural
resources are examples of capital structure that is so speciﬁc to an industry, and capital
accumulation is aﬀected by production quantities, as well as by the number of ﬁrms in the
industry.
1We study the eﬀect of the number of ﬁrms in an industry on equilibrium market out-
put when production depends on capital that evolves over time, isolating, one by one, the
strategic components that constitute the ﬁnal-good supply behavior of ﬁrms. We show the
impact of each of these strategic elements on aggregate ﬁrm supply and on the evolution of
capital.
One of the strategic components of ﬁrm behavior is the intratemporal Cournot-Nash
quantity competition among ﬁrms. The presence of a ﬁrm in the market constitutes a
market externality for the rest of the ﬁrms in the market. This strategic element is exactly
t h es a m ea st h eo n et h a ta p p e a r si nas t a t i cf r a m e w o r k . 1
In contrast to static environments, in the dynamic context, ﬁnal-good supply strategies of
ﬁrms involve decisions of optimal intertemporal capital-stock management. Any ﬁnal good
supply decision taken by ﬁrms today aﬀects the evolution of capital in the future. Firms
incorporate this concern into their ﬁnal product supply decisions.
Furthermore, the decisions of the ﬁrms with respect to how the capital stock evolves
over time, are complicated by the fact that other ﬁrms also have a direct inﬂuence on the
evolution of available capital. The presence of competition in the market for the capital
good, constitutes a dynamic externality for the ﬁrms in the capital market.2
In a dynamic oligopoly in which other ﬁrms appear both in the ﬁnal good market and
the capital market, both the market externality and the dynamic externality inﬂuence each
ﬁrm’s decisions. In this paper, we isolate the eﬀect of each externality on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnal
good supply by setting up a parametric model with a demand function and growth dynamics
that yield analytical characterizations for four alternative market structures. In this model
there is a natural symmetric equilibrium.
1 Several recent papers still deal with the issue of existence and uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibrium in
static frameworks. See, for example, Gaudet and Salant (1991), Novshek (1984a), (1984b) and (1985).
2 This externality was ﬁrst analyzed by Levhari and Mirman (1980).
2First, we characterize the strategy of a dynamic monopolist. This is the benchmark case.
In this case the output market is supplied by a monopolist who is also alone in inﬂuencing the
evolution of the capital stock. Second, we consider the case of two monopolists whose capital
evolution is inﬂuenced by the actions of both ﬁrms. In other words, there are two markets,
each supplied by a monopolist. We compare the results in this market structure to the results
of the pure monopolist case. We ﬁnd that the presence of the dynamic externality leads the
two monopolistic ﬁrms to supply more in each period, compared to the pure monopolist.
But more production in each period means more capital utilization, hence more capital
depreciation. Therefore, the dynamic externality reduces capital growth.
Third, when the two ﬁrms (both inﬂuencing the capital stock) also compete in the same
market, their aggregate supply in each period increases even more. This shows that the usual
result of the static Cournot model is present in the dynamic context as well. The market
externality makes ﬁrms engage in quantity Cournot competition. Indeed, in this case there
are three externalities all inﬂuencing output in the same direction, greater supply. These
three externalities are the usual static market externality plus a dynamic market externality
and a dynamic externality.
Last (fourth), we compare the benchmark monopolist’s strategy with that of two ﬁrms
that sell in the same market but extract capital from two separate sources. This comparison
isolates the impact of the market externality when the dynamic externality is not present.
The setup with two diﬀerent levels of stocks leads to the possibility of a non-symmetric equi-
librium, in this paper we continue to study only symmetric equilibrium outcomes. As in the
static model, the market externality increases aggregate supply in each period. The growth
rate of the capital stocks of the two capital sources in equilibrium depends on the elasticity
of demand. In particular, if the demand elasticity is low (high), the market externality leads
3to higher (lower) capital growth rate compared to the benchmark monopoly.
The presence of the two externalities, the dynamic and the market externality, in dynamic
oligopolistic markets was ﬁrst studied in Mirman (1979). Although Mirman (1979) does not
present an analysis of the impact of the two externalities on strategies, the two elements
are pointed out in necessary equilibrium conditions. Moreover, Mirman (1979) explores
the problems that can arise in dynamic oligopoly models under usual assumptions on the
objective of each ﬁrm and the dynamic constraints, assumptions that would lead to tractable
decision rules in a standard optimal control problem. In particular, in the dynamic oligopoly
case supply strategies may not, in general, be continuous functions. However, continuous
diﬀerentiability of supply strategies of all ﬁrms is a convenient property for each ﬁrm to
determine its equilibrium strategy.
Since not much is understood in the literature about the existence of equilibrium in
dynamic games and no general suﬃcient conditions for strategies to be continuously diﬀer-
entiable functions are known, the fact that we present a parametric model that enables us
to have analytical characterizations is not restrictive. On the contrary, studying a class of
models is the only way to know that the framework of analysis is well-behaved and an appro-
priate vehicle for running the thought experiments that isolate the impact of the dynamic
and the market externality on equilibrium strategies.
Our analysis does not involve linear demand functions, but isoelastic ones. Mirman
(1979) shows how linear demand functions lead to either a corner solution or an interior
solution that is exactly the same as the static solution. It is clear from this analysis of
Mirman (1979) that the linear demand model is not appropriate for addressing the issues
raised in this paper.
Our model can be applied in various other issues of industrial organization, e.g., knowl-
4edge accumulation models, industries using speciﬁc or vintage capital, natural-resource based
industries. Also, the fact that the framework is parametric, enables empirical estimation of
the parameters from time-series data, especially because we use iso-elastic demand and
production functions. Koulovatianos and Mirman (2003) study the link between market
structure and industry growth when ﬁrms pursue cost-reducing knowledge accumulation
through R&D investment using an alternative model speciﬁcation, but they point out the
same strategic elements behind ﬁrm behavior, namely the importance of the dynamic and
the market externality.
A dynamic model of imperfect competition has been studied also in Levhari and Mirman
(1980). It was made clear that ﬁrms in an imperfectly competitive environment change their
output in each period when the capital stock is part of the analysis. Dutta and Sundaram
(1992) and (1993) are the only papers stating general results about existence of equilibrium
in dynamic imperfect-competition setups. On the other hand, Ericson and Pakes (1995) show
the importance of Markov-perfect dynamics in an imperfectly competitive environment for
empirical work.
Vedenov and Miranda (2001) and Pakes and McGuire (2001) discuss numerical proce-
dures for oligopoly games with capital accumulation. Both studies suggest ways of overcom-
ing the several technical diﬃculties.
In section 2 we present the benchmark model, the dynamic monopoly. Sections 3 and 4
add the dynamic externality and the market externality in the benchmark model and make
comparisons. Section 5 examines the dynamics of the market when the market externality
comes in alone.
52. The Dynamic Monopoly
In this section we present the benchmark model, the dynamic monopoly. We show the
dynamic structure of the problem and the functional forms that enable us to obtain a closed
form solution, which allows us to characterize this solution. Moreover, we compare the
optimal behavior of the dynamic monopoly with the static monopoly.
Consider a monopoly operating in inﬁnite horizon, t =0 ,1,..., facing an inverse-demand
function p = D(q), in each period. Production of q needs capital and labor as inputs and
production technology is given by,
q = F (k,l) ,
with F1,F 2 > 0 and F quasiconcave. The cost of hired labor in each period is given by
c = c(l) ,
where c  > 0.
There are two determinants of capital evolution,
(a) An exogenous determinant of intertemporal capital supply (or reproduction),
captured by the function f. If the monopolistic ﬁrm does not operate at all,
capital would evolve according to,
kt+1 = f (kt) .
(b) An endogenous determinant, the amount the ﬁrm supplies in each period.
Capital stock depreciates over time depending on usage. The more ﬁnal-good
units produced, the more capital-stock units consumed.3 Capital-stock units
3 This idea of capital utilization is also studied by Greenwood et. al. (1988) in a general-equilibrium
framework. Higher utilization of capital wears equipment out, or it leaves less time for its maintenance.
6depreciate according to the function ψ(q), a strictly increasing function of q.
Therefore, when the monopolistic ﬁrm operates, capital evolves according to the
law of motion,
kt+1 = f (kt) − ψ (qt) ,( 1 )
for t =0 ,1,....
Equation (1) introduces the element of intertemporal choice. While deciding upon the
supply in each period, the ﬁrm chooses between using the capital stock now or investing it
for later use.
We eliminate the variable l in order to facilitate the exposition. Since F2 > 0,
l = L(k,q). (2)
Since F1,F2 > 0, L1 < 0 and L2 > 0. So, the cost in each period becomes a function of the
quantity produced and the available stock of capital,
c = c(L(k,q)) ,( 3 )
i.e. the cost of production decreases if there is more capital available. The objective of
the monopoly is to determine a supply-quantity decision rule as a function of the available
capital, q = Q(k), so that it maximizes its life-time proﬁts,
∞  
t=0
δ
t [D(qt)qt − c(L(kt,q t))] ,( 4 )
given k0 > 0 and with δ ≡ 1
1+r, the proﬁt discount factor, determined by an exogenous
constant interest rate r>0.
Our goal is to obtain closed form results and study their properties in all monopolistic and
duopolistic setups that we examine. In order to achieve this goal, we use speciﬁc functional
7forms that enable us to obtain decision rules of the form Q(k)=ωf (k),w i t hω ∈ (0,1).I n
particular,
D(q)=q
− 1
η ,w i t h η>1,( 5 )
and
f (k)=
 
αk
1− 1
η + φ
  η
η−1 ,( 6 )
i.e. the intertemporal production function of capital is a CES function. The depreciation
function of capital, ψ is,
ψ(q)=q ,
i.e. the units of capital that are consumed equal the supply of the ﬁnal good in each period.
The ﬁnal-good production function is,
q = F (k,l)=
 
αk
1− 1
η + φ
  1
η−1 l
1− 1
η ,
so
L(k,q)=
 
αk
1− 1
η + φ
 −
η
(η−1)2 q
η
η−1 .
Whereas the labor-cost function is
c(l)=νl
1− 1
η ,w i t h ν<1.
Therefore, the cost function is given by:
c(L(k,q)) = C (k)q ,
with
C (k) ≡ ν
 
αk
1− 1
η + φ
 − 1
η−1 .( 7 )
The problem of the monopolist can be written in a Bellman-equation form,
VM (k)= m a x
q≥0 {D(q)q − C (k)q + δVM (f (k) − q)} ,( 8 )
8where D(q) is given by (5), f (k) by (6) and C (k) by (7). The functions given by (6) and
(7) can be accommodated in our model in two ways. Both of these are consistent with linear
decision rules, however, they each imply diﬀerent dynamics. Speciﬁcally:
(i) Set φ =0and α ∈
 
1, 1
δ
 
. In this case, the intertemporal production function
of capital is f (k)=α
η
η−1k = Ak, a usual ingredient in growth theory, that may
lead to perpetual growth of the market if α ∈
 
1, 1
δ
 
.4 In case α =1 , the model
is appropriate for the study of markets trading a non-renewable resource.
(ii) Set φ>0 and α ∈ (0,1). I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o no fc a p i t a l
is a function of current capital and a constant parameter φ.N o t e t h a t t h i s
assumption implies that the elasticity of substitution between current capital
and the constant factor is the same as the elasticity of demand. There are
two reasons for this assumption. First, it provides linear analytic solutions,
which is especially important for the duopoly (diﬀerential game) case. Even if a
solution can be guaranteed in more general cases, studying various implications
of the model would be impossible. In other words, the analytical simplicity of
this framework allows us to derive the comparative statics (or dynamics) of the
model that is the very essences of this study. Second, with φ>0, the model has
a zero-growth-rate steady state.5
As mentioned above, using the functional forms (5), (6) and (7), the model gives a
decision rule of the form,
Q(k)=ω
 
αk
1− 1
η + φ
  η
η−1 .( 9 )
4 We place the upper bound 1
δ on parameter α in order to guarantee the boundedness of the value function
of each ﬁrm. The reasoning is clearer in the analysis of each setup.
5 Moreover, for scholars of empirical applications of our model, the function given by (6) has three parame-
ters, α, η and φ, giving enough degrees of freedom for treating data through data-mining approaches.
9Putting (9) into the objective function of the monopoly, as given by (4), we obtain the value
function,
VM (k)=
α
 
ω
1− 1
η − νω
 
1 − αδ(1 − ω)
1− 1
η
k
1− 1
η + κM ,( 1 0 )
where κM is a constant.6 We show that the properties of ω imply that the value function,
given by (10), is bounded and the proﬁts of the monopolist are positive. Substituting
equation (10) into equation (7), the Bellman equation of the monopolist becomes,
VM (k)= m a x
q≥0

 
 
q
1− 1
η − ν [f (k)]
− 1
η q +
αδ
 
ω
1− 1
η − νω
 
1 − αδ(1 − ω)
1− 1
η
[f (k) − q]
1− 1
η + δκM

 
 
,( 1 1 )
where f (k) is given by (6). The ﬁrst-order condition implies,
 
1 −
1
η
  
q
f (k)
 − 1
η
− ν =
αδ
 
1 − 1
η
  
ω
1− 1
η − νω
 
1 − αδ(1 − ω)
1− 1
η
 
1 −
q
f (k)
 − 1
η
.( 1 2 )
It is clear from equation (12) that the decision rule q = ωf (k), as is implied by (9), satisﬁes
the necessary condition, for all k>0. Substituting this decision rule into (12), we ﬁnd the
relationship that gives the condition from which the constant ω is characterized,
gM (ω) ≡
 
1 − 1
η
 
ω
− 1
η − ν
ω
− 1
η − ν
=
αδ
 
1 − 1
η
 
ω
(1 − ω)
1
η − αδ(1 − ω)
≡ h(ω) .( 1 3 )
We show that (13) implies that, ω ∈ (0,1) and that the value function is bounded, momentary
proﬁts and momentary marginal proﬁts are always positive. From the left-hand side of
equation (13), gM (0) = 1 − 1
η and gM ( 1 )=1− 1
η(1−ν),w h e r e a sg 
M (ω)=− ν
η2
ω
− 1
η −1
 
ω
− 1
η −ν
 2 < 0.
6 In particular,
κM = φ
 
ω
1− 1
η − νω
  
1 − α(1 − δ)(1− ω)
1− 1
η
 
 
1 − αδ(1 − ω)
1− 1
η
 
(1 − δ)
.
10From the right-hand side of equation, (13), h( 0 )=0 , h(1) = ∞ and
h
  (ω)=
 
1 −
1
η
 
αδ
1−(1− 1
η)ω
(1−ω)
1− 1
η − αδ
 
(1 − ω)
1
η − αδ(1 − ω)
 2 .
Noticing that 1 −
 
1 − 1
η
 
ω ≥ (1 − ω)
1− 1
η for all ω ∈ [0,1] with equality if and only if
ω =0 ,t h ef a c tt h a tαδ ≤ 1 implies that h  (ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ (0,1]. These proper-
ties of gM and h are depicted in Figures 1.a and 1.b. We denote the equilibrium con-
stant of the supply decision rule of the monopoly as ω
Dynamic
M . It is obvious that since
ω
Dynamic
M ∈ (0,1), αδ ≤ 1 and ν<1, the value function VM (k) is bounded, for all k>0
and that the momentary proﬁts,
 
ω
1− 1
η
M − νωM
 
[f (k)]
1− 1
η, are always positive. Therefore,
the life-time proﬁts of the monopoly are also positive. That the momentary marginal prof-
its,
  
1 − 1
η
 
ω
− 1
η
M − ν
 
[f (k)]
− 1
η, are always positive is easy to see by rearranging terms of
equation (13).
Since the momentary proﬁt function is inverse-U shaped, positive marginal proﬁts imply
that, for a given level of capital, the dynamic monopoly supplies less in each period compared
to the static monopoly. It is easy to see that the supply of a static monopoly is of the form,
q = ω
Static
M f (k) ,
where
ω
Static
M =

  
  
 
1− 1
η
ν
 η
1
if ν>1 − 1
η
if ν ≤ 1 − 1
η
.
S e t t i n gm a r g i n a lp r o ﬁ te q u a lt oz e r oi m p l i e st h a tgM (ω)=0 . The two cases of the static
strategies are depicted in Figures 1.a and 1.b. It is obvious that in both cases ωStatic
M >
ω
Dynamic
M .
The dynamic monopoly takes into account the inﬂuence that its current supply has on
the evolution of capital in the future. Supplying more in the current period reduces the
11capital stock in the future, so, (i) its cost per unit of output increases and, (ii) momentary
proﬁts,
 
ω
1− 1
η
M − νωM
 
[f (k)]
1− 1
η, are increasing in the stock of capital, so less capital in the
future reduces future proﬁts. This rationale behind the behavior of the dynamic monopolist
is transparent in the monopolist’s Euler equation. In particular, the ﬁrst-order condition
implied by (8) is,
D(q)+D
  (q)q − C (k)=δV
 
M
 
  k
 
.
Here   k is the capital stock in the subsequent period. Applying the envelope theorem to (8)
it is,
V
 
M (k)=−C
  (k)q + δV
 
M
 
  k
 
f
  (k) .
Combining the last two equations yields the Euler equation,
D(q)+D
  (q)q − C (k)=δ
 
−C
 
 
  k
 
  q +
 
D(  q)+D
  (  q)   q − C
 
  k
  
f
   
  k
  
,( 1 4 )
where   q is the output strategy of the ﬁrm in the subsequent period. The ﬁrm counterbalances
its current marginal proﬁt with, (i) the discounted marginal increase in the cost of producing
next period’s quantity caused by a decrease in next period’s capital and, (ii) next period’s
marginal proﬁt multiplied by the marginal product of next period’s capital.7 Both future
considerations on the right-hand side of the Euler equation come with a positive sign, both
contributing to a reduction in current supply compared to the static case, for which the right
hand side of equation (13) is zero, meaning that in the static case the future plays no role.
This is captured by Figures 1.a and 1.b. It should be noted that if the constraint imposed
by the capital stock is zero, then capital plays no role in the dynamics of this monopoly.
However, in our speciﬁcation of the model the right hand side of equation (13) is never zero
i.e., ω
Dynamic
M ∈ (0,1) and thus the capital constraint is always binding.
7 Substituting the policy q = ωf (k) into equation (14) leads, after some algebra, to the same expression as
(13).
123. Two Monopolists Extracting Capital from the Same Source
In this section we look at two identical ﬁrms A and B, each selling in its own market as a
monopolist, facing the same demand function given by (5), having the same cost function
given by (7) and extracting capital from the same source. So, capital evolves according to,
kt+1 = f (kt) − qA,t − qB,t ,( 1 5 )
with f (k) given by (6). Compared to the monopoly problem of the previous section, the two
monopolistic ﬁrms have a direct capital-accumulation interaction. We say that the presence
of both ﬁrms using the same source of capital gives rise to a dynamic externality. The goal
of this section is to study the impact of the dynamic externality on aggregate ﬁnal-product
supply and capital dynamics.8
We denote the value function of the two monopolistic ﬁrms with a direct capital-accumulation
interaction as VA,m and VB,m. Due to the symmetry of the problem we can focus on the prob-
lem of ﬁrm A without loss of generality. The problem of ﬁrm A in a Bellman-equation form
is given by,
VA,m (k)= m a x
qA≥0 {D(qA)qA − C (k)qA + δVA,m (f (k) − qA − QB (k))} ,( 1 6 )
where QB (k) is the supply strategy as a function of the capital stock of ﬁrm B. The problem
of ﬁrm B is given by the same Bellman equation as in (16), with the roles of A and B
switched.
Using the functional forms (5), (6) and (7), and taking account of the symmetry of the
two ﬁrms the model gives a decision rule of the form,
QA (k)=QB (k)=ωf (k) ,( 1 7 )
8 The term ‘dynamic externality’ was ﬁrst introduced by Mirman (1979). Levhari and Mirman (1980)
provide another model that oﬀers an explicit analysis of the dynamic externality. The model of this paper
enables us to study duopolistic cases in which there is also a market externality.
13with ω ∈ (0,1). Substituting (17) into the objective of ﬁrm A gives the value function,
VA,m (k)=
α
 
ω
1− 1
η − νω
 
1 − αδ(1 − 2ω)
1− 1
η
k
1− 1
η + κm ,( 1 8 )
where κm i sac o n s t a n t . 9 Substituting equation (18) into (16) yields,
VA,m (k)= m a x
qA≥0

 
 
q
1− 1
η
A − ν [f (k)]
− 1
η qA +
αδ
 
ω
1− 1
η − νω
 
1 − αδ(1 − 2ω)
1− 1
η
[f (k) − qA − QB (k)]
1− 1
η + δκm

 
 
,
(19)
where f (k) is given by (6). The ﬁrst-order condition implies,
 
1 −
1
η
  
qA
f (k)
 − 1
η
− ν =
αδ
 
1 − 1
η
  
ω
1− 1
η − νω
 
1 − αδ(1 − 2ω)
1− 1
η
 
1 −
qA
f (k)
−
QB (k)
f (k)
 − 1
η
.( 2 0 )
From equation (20) the decision rules qA = qB = ωf (k) satisfy the necessary conditions for
all k>0. Substituting this decision rule into (20), yields the condition that characterizes
the constant ω,
gm (χ) ≡ 2
 
1 − 1
η
 
2
1
ηχ
− 1
η − ν
2
1
ηχ
− 1
η − ν
=
αδ
 
1 − 1
η
 
χ
(1 − χ)
1
η − αδ(1 − χ)
≡ h(χ) ,( 2 1 )
where χ ≡ 2ω.W ef o c u so nχ, the aggregate fraction of f (k) utilized by both ﬁrms. Note
that the right-hand side of equation (21), h(χ), is the same function as the right-hand side
of equation (13). This similarity helps us compare the monopolistic aggregate supply of this
section with the decisions of the monopoly of the previous section.
We show that from (21), χ ∈ (0,1) and that the value function is bounded. Moreover,
momentary proﬁts and momentary marginal proﬁts are positive. It is easy to see that the
9 In particular,
κm = φ
 
ω
1− 1
η − νω
  
1 − α(1 − δ)(1− 2ω)
1− 1
η
 
 
1 − αδ(1 − 2ω)
1− 1
η
 
(1 − δ)
.
14left-hand side of equation (21), gm (χ),h a sgm ( 0 )=2
 
1 − 1
η
 
and gm ( 1 )=2

1 − 2
1
η
η
 
2
1
η −ν
 

,
whereas g 
m (χ)=− ν
η2
2
1
η +1χ
− 1
η −1
 
2
1
η χ
− 1
η −ν
 2 < 0.
The aggregate supply of two static monopolies extracting from the same source of capital
is of the form,
q = χ
Static
m f (k) ,
where
χ
Static
m =

  
  
 
1− 1
η
ν
 η
1
if ν>2
1
η
 
1 − 1
η
 
if ν ≤ 2
1
η
 
1 − 1
η
  .
In the case ν>2
1
η
 
1 − 1
η
 
, gm
 
χStatic
m
 
=0 . All cases are depicted in Figures 2.a and 2.b,
in which it is obvious that χDynamic
m ∈ (0,1),w h e r e a sχDynamic
m <χ Static
m . Following the same
reasoning as in the pure dynamic monopoly case, we see that the value function of each ﬁrm
is bounded, the momentary (and the inﬁnite-horizon) proﬁts and the momentary marginal
proﬁts are positive, for all k>0.
3.1 Impact of the dynamic externality on aggregate supply and
capital dynamics
Since the model of this section contains the dynamic externality, a direct comparison with
the benchmark dynamic monopoly of the previous section enables us to evaluate the inﬂuence
of the dynamic externality on equilibrium strategies.
The ﬁrst-order condition implied by (16) is,
D(qA)+D
  (qA)qA − C (k)=δV
 
A,m
 
  k
 
.
Recall that   k is the capital stock in the next period. Applying the envelope theorem to (16),
V
 
A,m (k)=−C
  (k)qA + δV
 
A,m
 
  k
 
[f
  (k) − Q
 
B (k)] .
15Combining the last two equations yields the Euler equation,
D(qA)+D
  (qA)qA−C (k)=δ
 
−C
 
 
  k
 
  qA +
 
D(  qA)+D
  (  qA)   qA − C
 
  k
   
f
 
 
  k
 
− Q
 
B
 
  k
   
.
(22)
Where   qA is the output strategy of ﬁrm A in the next period. Note that the dynamic
externality appears in the Euler equation (22) embodied in the term Q 
B
 
  k
 
. This means that
this ﬁrm must take account of the eﬀect that the other ﬁrm has on any future investments.
From (22), the ﬁrm counterbalances its current marginal proﬁt with, (i) the discounted
marginal increase in the cost of producing next period’s quantity caused by a decrease in next
period’s capital and (ii) next period’s marginal proﬁt multiplied by the diﬀerence between
the marginal product of next period’s capital from the marginal change in next period’s supply
of the other ﬁrm due to a change in next period’s capital, i.e., the dynamic externality.10
In equilibrium, f 
 
  k
 
− Q 
B
 
  k
 
=
 
1 − ωDynamic
m
 
f 
 
  k
 
,which is positive for all   k>0.11
Both future considerations on the right-hand side of the Euler equation come with a positive
sign, both contributing to a reduction in current supply compared to the static case. This
is captured by Figures 2.a and 2.b.
We compare the total current extraction in the two cases, namely χDynamic
m ≡ 2ωDynamic
m
with χ
Dynamic
M ≡ ω
Dynamic
M .
Let
G(χ,N) ≡ N
 
1 − 1
η
 
N
1
ηχ
− 1
η − ν
N
1
ηχ
− 1
η − ν
.
Then,
G(χ,1) = gM (χ) and G(χ,2) = gm (χ) ,
10Substituting the policies qA = qB = ωf (k) into equation (22) leads, after some algebra, to the same
expression as (21).
11Because the strategies are linear in f (k), similar to the strategies in Levhari and Mirman (1980), we know
that the strategies of both ﬁrms are global maxima of each ﬁrm’s value function (which is concave for all
k>0). Mirman (1979) presents examples of diﬃculties that may arise if the strategy QB (k) of the other
ﬁrm were concave. The concavity of the value function of ﬁrm A is not guaranteed.
16whereas,
∂G(χ,N)
∂N
=
 
1 − 1
η
 
N
1
ηχ
− 1
η − ν
N
1
ηχ
− 1
η − ν
+
ν
η2
N
1
ηχ
− 1
η
 
N
1
ηχ
− 1
η − ν
 2 > 0 for all N ≥ 1.
So, for all χ ∈ (0,1) such that
 
1 − 1
η
 
χ
− 1
η −ν>0 (which also implies that
 
1 − 1
η
 
2
1
ηχ
− 1
η −
ν>0), it is,
gm (χ) >g M (χ) .
The latter inequality,
χ
Dynamic
m >χ
Dynamic
M ,
is depicted in Figure 3, i.e. total extraction is higher when two monopolies extract capital
from the same source and: (i) if φ =0and α ∈
 
1, 1
δ
 
t h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h em a r k e to f
the single monopoly is forever higher; and (ii) if φ>0 and α ∈ (0,1), the single monopoly
reaches a higher steady state.
To sum up, the dynamic externality makes ﬁrms increase their aggregate supply in each
period. Although ﬁrms take account of the fact that more extraction reduces capital in the
future and, therefore, reduces future proﬁts, both ﬁrms extract more capital in aggregate
terms in each period, reducing the growth of capital.
4. Duopoly with Firms Extracting Capital from the Same Source
In this section both ﬁrms extract capital from the same source, and sell outputs in the same
market. Selling in the same market yields a ‘market’ externality as well as a ‘dynamic’
externality. We study the impact of the market externality, while the dynamic externality is
present, by comparing the equilibrium of this section with the equilibrium of the previous
sections. It should be noted that, as in the static case, a ‘static’ market externality is always
present in the duopoly solution. In the dynamic case, studied in this section, there is also a
17‘dynamic’ market externality. Both of these externalities have an eﬀect on the equilibrium
solution.
We look at two identical ﬁrms, A and B, that sell in the same market and extract capital
from the same source. The demand function is given by (5). Both ﬁrms have the same cost
function given by (7). So, capital evolves according to:
kt+1 = f (kt) − qA,t − qB,t ,( 2 3 )
with f (k) given by (6). We denote the value function of the duopolistic ﬁrms with a direct
capital-accumulation interaction as VA,d and VB,d. Due to the symmetry of the problem we
can focus on the problem of ﬁrm A without loss of generality. The problem of ﬁrm A in a
Bellman-equation form is given by,
VA,d (k)= m a x
qA≥0 {D(qA + QB (k))qA − C (k)qA + δVA,d (f (k) − qA − QB (k))} ,( 2 4 )
where QB (k) is the supply strategy of ﬁrm B. The problem of ﬁrm B is given by the Bellman
equation as in (24), except that A and B are switched.
Note that, the eﬀect of ﬁrm B on the decisions of ﬁrm A appears in two places. These
are the sources of all the externalities. Compared to the monopoly problem of the previous
section, the two duopolistic ﬁrms have a direct market interaction. We say that the presence
of the other ﬁrm in the same market causes a market externality.12 In this section we
study the impact of the market externality on aggregate ﬁnal-product supply and capital
dynamics.
Due to the functional forms (5), (6) and (7), and the symmetry of the two ﬁrms the
model gives a decision rule of the form,
QA (k)=QB (k)=ωf (k) ,( 2 5 )
12The term ‘market externality’ was also used by Mirman (1979).
18with ω ∈ (0,1). Substituting (25) into the objective of ﬁrm A gives the following value
function,
VA,d (k)=
α
 
2
− 1
ηω
1− 1
η − νω
 
1 − αδ(1 − 2ω)
1− 1
η
k
1− 1
η + κd ,( 2 6 )
where κd is a constant.13 Substituting equation (26) into (24) yields,
VA,d (k)=m a x
qA≥0

 
 
[qA + QB (k)]
1− 1
η − ν [f (k)]
− 1
η qA+
+
αδ
 
2
− 1
ηω
1− 1
η − νω
 
1 − αδ(1 − 2ω)
1− 1
η
[f (k) − qA − QB (k)]
1− 1
η + δκd

 
 
,( 2 7 )
where f (k) is given by (6). The ﬁrst-order condition implies,
 
qA
f (k)
+
QB (k)
f (k)
 − 1
η
−
1
η
 
qA
f (k)
+
QB (k)
f (k)
 − 1
η−1 qA
f (k)
− ν =
=
αδ
 
1 − 1
η
  
2
− 1
ηω
1− 1
η − νω
 
1 − αδ(1 − 2ω)
1− 1
η
 
1 −
qA
f (k)
−
QB (k)
f (k)
 − 1
η
.( 2 8 )
From equation (28) the decision rules qA = qB = ωf (k), as it is implied by (25), satisﬁes
the necessary condition, for all k>0. Substituting this decision rule into (28), we arrive at
the relationship that gives the condition from which we can characterize the constant ω,
gd (χ) ≡ 2
 
1 − 1
2η
 
χ
− 1
η − ν
χ
− 1
η − ν
=
αδ
 
1 − 1
η
 
χ
(1 − χ)
1
η − αδ(1 − χ)
≡ h(χ) ,( 2 9 )
where χ ≡ 2ω.W ef o c u so nχ, the aggregate fraction of f (k) extracted by both ﬁrms. We
stress that the right-hand side of equation (29), h(χ) is the same function as the right-hand
side of equation (13). This helps us in comparing the duopolistic aggregate supply of this
section with the decisions of the two previous sections.
13In particular,
κd = φ
 
2
− 1
ηω
1− 1
η − νω
  
1 − α(1 − δ)(1− 2ω)
1− 1
η
 
 
1 − αδ (1 − 2ω)
1− 1
η
 
(1 − δ)
.
19We show that the constant χ that satisﬁes (29) is such that, χ ∈ (0,1).A l s o , t h e
value function is bounded, momentary proﬁts and momentary marginal proﬁts are always
positive. It is easy to see that the left-hand side of equation (29), gd ( 0 )=2
 
1 − 1
2η
 
and
gd ( 1 )=2
 
1 − 1
2η(1−ν)
 
,w h e r e a sg 
d (χ)=− ν
η2
χ
− 1
η −1
 
χ
− 1
η −ν
 2 < 0.
The aggregate supply of a static duopoly extracting capital from the same source is,
q = χ
Static
d f (k) ,
where,
χ
Static
d =

  
  
 
1− 1
2η
ν
 η
1
if ν>1 − 1
2η
if ν ≤ 1 − 1
2η
.
In the case ν>1 − 1
2η, gd
 
χStatic
d
 
=0 . All cases are depicted in Figures 4.a and 4.b, in
which χ
Dynamic
d ∈ (0,1), whereas χ
Dynamic
d <χ Static
d . Following the same reasoning as in the
pure dynamic monopoly case, the value function of each ﬁrm is bounded, the momentary
(and the inﬁnite-horizon) proﬁts and the momentary marginal proﬁts are positive, for all
k>0.
4.1 Impact of the dynamic market externality on aggregate supply
and capital dynamics
In this section we analyze the eﬀect of the market externality on the equilibrium outputs
when the dynamic externality is present. We compare the equilibrium strategies of the model
of this section with those of the previous section.
The ﬁrst-order condition implied by (24) is,
D(qA + QB (k)) + D
  (qA + QB (k))qA − C (k)=δV
 
A,d
 
  k
 
.
Applying the envelope theorem to (24) yields,
V
 
A,d (k)=D
  (qA + QB (k))qAQ
 
B (k) − C
  (k)qA + δV
 
A,d
 
  k
 
[f
  (k) − Q
 
B (k)] .
20Combining the last two equations yields the Euler equation,
D(qA + QB (k)) + D
  (qA + QB (k))qA − C (k)=δ
 
D
  (  qA + QB (k))   qAQ
 
B
 
  k
 
−
−C
 
 
  k
 
  qA +
 
D(  qA)+D
  (  qA)   qA − C
 
  k
    
f
 
 
  k
 
− Q
 
B
 
  k
   
.( 3 0 )
Note that, as in the previous section, the dynamic externality is embodied in the term,
Q 
B
 
  k
 
, appearing at the end of the right hand side of equation (30). However, the market
externalities, both ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’, are now also apparent. In equation (30), the term,
QB (k), is the usual ‘static’ duopoly market externality while the term, Q 
B
 
  k
 
, but this
time appearing in the ﬁrst term of the right hand side of (30), is the ‘dynamic’ market
externality. It should be noted that the eﬀect of these externalities can not be isolated.
The ﬁrm counterbalances its current marginal proﬁt with: (i) the marginal change in next
period’s price multiplied by next period’s supplied quantity of the ﬁrm times the marginal
change in next period’s supply of the other ﬁrm due to a change in next period’s capital
(dynamic market externality); (ii) the discounted marginal increase in the cost of producing
next period’s quantity caused by a decrease in next period’s capital; and (iii) next period’s
marginal proﬁt multiplied by the diﬀerence between the marginal product of next period’s
capital from the marginal change in next period’s supply of the other ﬁrm due to a change
in next period’s capital (dynamic externality).14
Note, ﬁnally, that in equilibrium, f 
 
  k
 
− Q 
B
 
  k
 
=
 
1 − ω
Dynamic
d
 
f 
 
  k
 
,w h i c hi s
positive for all   k>0,y e tt h et e r mD 
 
  qA + QB
 
  k
  
  qAQ 
B
 
  k
 
is negative. It is interesting
to note that this dynamic equilibrium condition looks strikingly similar to the equilibrium
condition of the previous section. However, they are diﬀerent. The diﬀerence is due to
the market externalities, which aﬀects the equilibrium strategies of each ﬁrm. Since the
14Substituting the policies qA = qB = ωf (k) into equation (30) leads, after some algebra, to the same
expression as (29).
21strategies of each ﬁrm changed, the equilibrium steady state is also changed. In equilibrium,
the right-hand side of equation (30) is positive, as it is implied by Figures 4.a and 4.b. As we
proved above: χ
Dynamic
d <χ Static
m . The momentary proﬁt function is again inverse-U shaped,
so χ
Dynamic
d <χ Static
m , in equilibrium implies that momentary proﬁts are always positive in
the dynamic case, hence the right-hand side of equation (30) is also positive, the market
externality is dominated by the dynamic externality in equilibrium.
We compare the total extraction in the monopolistic versus the duopolistic markets in
which both ﬁrms extract capital from the same source, namely χDynamic
m ≡ 2ωDynamic
m with
χ
Dynamic
d ≡ 2ω
Dynamic
d . For the comparison, we focus on the interval of χ for which, in both
cases, the momentary proﬁts are positive, namely,
 
1 −
1
η
 
2
1
ηχ
− 1
η − ν>0 ,( 3 1 )
and
 
1 −
1
2η
 
χ
− 1
η − ν>0 .( 3 2 )
i.e.,
χ<max


2


1 − 1
η
ν


η
,


1 − 1
2η
ν


η

 .( 3 3 )
Noticing that,
gm ( 0 )=2
 
1 −
1
η
 
< 2
 
1 −
1
2η
 
= g
d (0) ,
we show that g 
m (χ) <g  
d (χ) in the interval given by (33). It is easy to verify that
g
 
m (χ) <g
 
d (χ) ⇔ 2
1
η 2
1
2(1− 1
η) − 1
2
1
2(1+ 1
η) − 1
χ
− 1
η − ν>0 ,
or
g
 
m (χ) <g
 
d (χ) ⇔ χ<

2
1
η
ν
2
1
2(1− 1
η) − 1
2
1
2(1+ 1
η) − 1


η
.
22It is easy to show that,

2
1
η
ν
2
1
2(1− 1
η) − 1
2
1
2(1+ 1
η) − 1


η
> max


2


1 − 1
η
ν


η
,


1 − 1
2η
ν


η

 ,
s o( 3 3 )i m p l i e st h a tf o ra l lv a l u e so fχ such that momentary marginal proﬁts are strictly
positive, g 
m (χ) <g  
d (χ). Combining this last inequality with the fact that g 
m (0) <g  
d(0),
we can see from Figure 5 that
χ
Dynamic
m <χ
Dynamic
d .
4.2 Dynamics and steady states
S of a rw eh a v ec o n c l u d e dt h a t ,
χ
Dynamic
M <χ
Dynamic
m <χ
Dynamic
d .
Since the law of motion of capital in equilibrium is,
kt+1 =( 1− χ)f (kt).
In all three cases capital grows faster for the monopoly and slower for the duopoly when
both ﬁrms extract from the same source of capital. The growth rate of capital in the case
of two monopolies extracting capital from the same source is in-between. In Figure 6 we
depict the dynamics and the steady states if φ>0 and α ∈ (0,1).F o rt h ec a s eo fφ =0and
α ∈
 
1, 1
δ
 
, there may be perpetual positive growth or gradual shrinkage of capital to zero in
the long run.
In brief, the dynamic externality reduces capital growth and when both the dynamic and
the market externality are present, capital growth falls even more.
It remains to see the case of a duopoly with ﬁrms extracting capital from diﬀerent sources.
In this case we are able to isolate the market externality and compare the dynamics with
23those of a pure monopoly or with the dynamics of a duopoly with both the market and the
dynamic externality present.
5. Duopoly with ﬁrms extracting capital from diﬀerent sources
The goal of this section is to isolate the impact of the market externality on the supply
behavior of a ﬁrm that operates in a dynamic environment. In order to achieve this, we
depart from the benchmark monopoly case by adding one more ﬁrm in the market, but not
in the source of capital that the ﬁrm utilizes. In this way we evaluate the impact of the
market externality, while the dynamic externality is not present.
We examine the behavior of two identical ﬁrms, A and B, each utilizing capital from
their own, separate capital source. So, we distinguish between two stocks of capital, kA and
kB, and assume that the initial capital stocks are equal, i.e. it is kA,0 = kB,0 > 0.T h e
demand function is given by (5). Both ﬁrms have the same cost function given by (7). So,
the capital stocks evolve according to,
kA,t+1 = f (kA,t) − qA,t ,( 3 4 )
kB,t+1 = f (kB,t) − qB,t ,( 3 5 )
with f (k) given by (6) with φ =0and α ∈
 
1, 1
δ
 
. The analysis of this section, leading again
to strategies of the form Q(k)=ωf (k), is possible only for these values of parameters α and
φ, namely the case of linear production of capital.15 So, comparisons of aggregate supply
15T os e ew h yi tm u s tb et h a tφ =0and α ∈
 
1, 1
δ
 
, we calculate the value function of ﬁrm A for the general
case of φ ≥ 0, using QA (kA,k B)=ωf (kA) and QB (kA,k B)=ωf (kB). The resulting value function is,
VA,D (kA,k B)=
α
 
ω
1− 1
η (kA + kB)
− 1
η kA − νωk
1− 1
η
A
 
1 − αδ(1 − ω)
1− 1
η
+
φδ
 
ω
1− 1
η
 
1+
f(kB)
f(kA)
 − 1
η
kA − νω
 
(1 − δ)
 
1 − αδ (1 − ω)
1− 1
η
  .
Without φ =0 , this value function does not validate the strategies QA (kA,k B)=ωf (kA) and QB (kA,k B)=
ωf (kB).
24in this setup with the benchmark monopoly or the other setups is restricted to the case of
a linear function f (k)=α
η
η−1k.
We denote the value function of the duopolistic ﬁrms without a direct capital-accumulation
interaction, without a dynamic externality, as VA,D and VB,D. These value functions depend
on both capital stocks, (kA,k B). Due to the symmetry of the problem we can focus on the
problem of ﬁrm A without loss of generality. The problem of the ﬁrm A in a Bellman-
equation form is given by,
VA,D (kA,k B)=m a x
qA≥0 {D(qA + QB (kA,k B))qA − C (kA)qA+
+δVA,D (f (kA) − qA ,f (kB) − QB (kA,k B))} ,( 3 6 )
where QB (kA,k B) is the supply strategy of ﬁrm B. The problem of ﬁrm B is given by
switching A and B in the Bellman equation (36).
Compared to the monopoly problem of the ﬁrst section, the two duopolistic ﬁrms have
a direct market interaction. The presence of the other ﬁrm in the same market causes a
‘static’ market externality, as discussed in the previous section.
Using the functional forms (5), (6) and (7), together with the symmetry of the two ﬁrms
the model gives decision rules of the form,
QA (kA,k B)=ωf (kA) ,( 3 7 )
QA (kA,k B)=ωf (kB) ,( 3 8 )
with ω ∈ (0,1). Substituting (37) and (38) into the objective of ﬁrm A gives the following
value function,
VA,D (kA,k B)=
α
 
ω
1− 1
η (kA + kB)
− 1
η kA − νωk
1− 1
η
A
 
1 − αδ(1 − ω)
1− 1
η
.( 3 9 )
Substituting equation (39) into (36) yields,
25VA,D (kA,k B)= m a x
qA≥0

 
 
[qA + QB (kA,k B)]
1− 1
η − ν [f (kA)]
− 1
η qA+
+
αδ
 
ω
1− 1
η [f (kA) − qA + f (kB) − QB (kA,k B)]
− 1
η (f (kA) − qA) − νω(f (kA) − qA)
1− 1
η
 
1 − αδ(1 − ω)
1− 1
η

 
 
,
(40)
where f (k) is given by (6). The ﬁrst-order condition implies,
[qA + QB (kA,k B)]
− 1
η
 
1 −
1
η
qA
qA + QB (kA,k B)
 
− ν [f (kA)]
− 1
η =
=
αδ
 
ω
1− 1
η
 
  kA +   kB
 − 1
η
 
1 − 1
η
  kA
  kA+  kB
 
−
 
1 − 1
η
 
νω
 
  kA
 − 1
η
 
1 − αδ(1 − ω)
1− 1
η
.( 4 1 )
Substituting the decision rules qA = ωf (kA), qB = ωf (k), together with (34) and (35) into
(41) we obtain the condition from which we can characterize the constant ω,
gD (ω) ≡
2
− 1
η
 
1 − 1
2η
 
ω
− 1
η − ν
2
− 1
η(1− 1
2η)
1− 1
η
ω
− 1
η − ν
=
αδ
 
1 − 1
η
 
ω
(1 − ω)
1
η − αδ(1 − ω)
≡ h(ω) .( 4 2 )
We show that, ω ∈ (0,1) and that the value function is bounded, momentary proﬁts and
momentary marginal proﬁts are always positive. It is easy to see that the left-hand side of
equation (42), gD (ω),h a sgD ( 0 )=1− 1
η and gD (1) =
 
1 − 1
η
  2
− 1
η(1− 1
2η)−ν
2
− 1
η(1− 1
2η)−ν(1− 1
η)
,w h e r e a s ,
g
 
D (ω)=−
ν
η (η − 1)
2
− 1
η
 
1 − 1
2η
 
ω
− 1
η−1
 
2
− 1
η(1− 1
2η)
1− 1
η
ω
− 1
η − ν
 2 .
The supply of a static duopoly extracting capital from the same source is of the form,
q = ω
Static
D f (k) ,
where
ω
Static
D =

  
  
1
2
 
1− 1
2η
ν
 η
1
if ν>2
− 1
η
 
1 − 1
2η
 
if ν ≤ 2
− 1
η
 
1 − 1
2η
  .
26In the case ν>2
− 1
η
 
1 − 1
2η
 
, gD
 
ωStatic
D
 
=0 . All cases are depicted in Figures 7.a and 7.b,
f r o mw h i c hi ti so b v i o u st h a tω
Dynamic
D ∈ (0,1), whereas ω
Dynamic
D <ω Static
D . Following the
same reasoning as in the dynamic monopoly case, we see that the value function of each ﬁrm
is bounded, the momentary (and the inﬁnite-horizon) proﬁts and the momentary marginal
proﬁts are positive, for all k>0.
5.1 Impact of the static market externality on ﬁrm supply and
capital dynamics
The ﬁrst-order conditions implied by (36) are,
D(qA + QB (kA,k B)) + D
  (qA + QB (kA,k B))qA − C (kA)=δV
 
A,D
 
  kA,   kB
 
.
Applying the envelope theorem on (36) yields,
∂VA,D (kA,k B)
∂kA
= D
  (qA + QB (kA,k B))qA
∂QB (kA,k B)
∂kA
− C
  (kA)qA +
+δ


∂VA,D
 
  kA,   kB
 
∂  kA
f
  (kA) −
∂VA,D
 
  kA,   kB
 
∂  kB
∂QB (kA,k B)
∂kA

 .
Combining the last two equations yields the necessary condition,
D(qA + QB (kA,k B))+D
  (qA + QB (kA,k B))qA−C (kA)=
= δ
 
−C
 
 
  kA
 
  qA +
 
D
 
  qA + QB
 
  kA,   kB
  
+ D
 
 
  qA + QB
 
  kA,   kB
  
  qA − C
 
  kA
  
f
 
 
  kA
 
+
+

 
D
 
 
  qA + QB
 
  kA,   kB
  
  qA − δ
∂VA,D
 
    kA,
    kB
 
∂
    kB

 

∂QB
 
  kA,   kB
 
∂  kA

  
  
,
(43)
where
    k is the capital stock two periods ahead. The necessary optimal condition of ﬁrm
B is given by the same equation as (43), except that A and B are switched. Note that
the only externality appearing in equation (43) is the market externality, i.e., there is no
27dynamic externality in this model. The ﬁrm counterbalances its current marginal proﬁt
with: (i) the discounted marginal increase in the cost of producing next period’s quantity
caused by a decrease in next period’s capital; (ii) next period’s marginal proﬁt multiplied by
the marginal product of next period’s capital period’s capital; and (iii) the diﬀerence in the
marginal change in next period’s price multiplied by next period’s supplied quantity of the
ﬁrm, from the discounted marginal change in the value function caused by a change in the
capital stock of the other ﬁrm two periods ahead, times the marginal change in next period’s
supply of the other ﬁrm due to a change in next period’s capital.16 The last term of the
right-hand side of equation (43) vanishes, since, in equilibrium QB (kA,k B)=ωf (kB),s o
∂QB(kA,kB)
∂kA =0 .
Comparing growth in the cases of this duopoly setup and the pure monopoly, reveals
the impact of the static market externality on industry growth. The right-hand sides of
equations (42) and (13) are the same. Moreover, after some algebra, it is,
gM (ω) <g D (ω) ⇐⇒ 2
− 1
η
 
1 −
1
2η
 
> 1 −
1
η
.
Noticing that 2
− 1
η
 
1 − 1
2η
 
> 1 − 1
η if and only if η<2.73, ﬁgures 8.a and 8.b depict that
ωM <ω D ⇐⇒ η<2.73 .
For all η’s, both in the static and the dynamic case, the total fraction of resources extracted
is higher in the duopolistic setup. Yet, the interesting diﬀerence in the dynamic setup is
that for η<2.73 each duopolistic ﬁrm utilizes a higher fraction of their capital resources
compared to being a monopolist. So, for η<2.73, the growth rate of capital is lower in
the duopolistic setup compared to the growth rate of a monopoly. The opposite holds if
16Substituting the policies QA (kA,k B)=ωf (kA), QB (kA,k B)=ωf (kB) into equation (43) leads, after
some algebra, to the same expression as (42).
28η>2.73.T h u s ,i fη>2.73, duopolies can make higher proﬁts in the long run compared to
the monopolist, despite the fact that duopolists share the market.
To sum up, the equilibrium industry dynamics change the inﬂuence of the ‘static’ market
externality. In particular, the dynamic externality dominates the market externality.
REFERENCES
Dutta, Prajit K. and Rangarajan K. Sundaram (1992): “Markovian Equilibrium in
a Class of Stochastic Games: Existence Theorems for Discounted and Undiscounted
Models,” Economic Theory, Vol. 2(2).
Dutta, Prajit K. and Rangarajan K. Sundaram (1993): “How Diﬀerent Can Strategic
Models Be?” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 60, pp. 42-61.
Ericson, Richard and Ariel Pakes (1995): “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A
Framework for Empirical Work,” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol 62(1), pp.
53-82.
Gaudet, Gerhard and Stephen W. Salant (1991): “Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium:
New Results from Old Methods,” The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 58(2), pp.
399-404.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz and Gregory Huﬀman (1988): “Investment, Capac-
ity Utilization, and the Real Business Cycle,” The American Economic Review, Vol.
78(3), pp. 402-417.
Koulovatianos, Christos and Leonard J. Mirman (2003): “R&D Investment, Market
Structure, and Industry Growth,” Mimeo, University of Virginia.
Levhari, David and Leonard J. Mirman (1980): “The Great Fish War: an Example
using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution,” The Bell Journal of Economics, Volume 11,
Issue 1, pp. 322-334.
Mirman, Leonard J. (1979): “Dynamic Models of Fishing: A Heuristic Approach,”
Control Theory in Mathematical Economics, Liu and Sutinen, Eds.
Novshek, William (1984a): “Finding All n-ﬁrm Cournot Equilibria,” International
Economic Review, Vol. 25, pp. 62-70.
Novshek, William (1984b): “Perfectly Competitive Markets as the Limits of Cournot
Markets,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 34, pp. 72-82.
29Novshek, William (1985): “On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium,” The Review of
Economic Studies, Volume 52(1), pp. 85-98.
Pakes, Ariel and Paul McGuire (2001): “Stochastic Algorithms, Symmetric Markov-
Perfect Equilibria, and the ‘Curse’ of Dimensionality,” Econometrica, Vol. 69(5), pp.
1261-81.
Vedenov, Dmitry V. and Mario J. Miranda (2001): “Numerical Solution of Dynamic
Oligopoly Games with Capital Investment,” Economic Theory, Vol. 18 pp.237-261.
300
(
)
ω
M
g
(
)
ω
h
ω
η
1
1
−
(
)
ν
η
−
−
1
1
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
M
ω
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
.
a
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
S
t
a
t
i
c
M
ω
η
ν
1
1
−
>
10
(
)
ω
M
g
(
)
ω
h
ω
η
1
1
−
(
)
ν
η
−
−
1
1
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
M
ω
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
.
b
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
1
=
S
t
a
t
i
c
M
ω
η
ν
1
1
−
≤0
(
)
χ
m
g
(
)
χ
h
χ








−
η
1
1
2








−
−
−
ν
η
η
1
2
1
1
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
m
χ
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
2
.
a
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
S
t
a
t
i
c
m
χ








−
>
η
ν
η
1
1
2
1
10
(
)
χ
m
g
(
)
χ
h
χ








−
η
1
1
2








−
−
−
ν
η
η
1
2
1
1
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
m
χ
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
2
.
b
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
1
=
S
t
a
t
i
c
m
χ








−
≤
η
ν
η
1
1
2
10
(
)
χ
m
g
(
)
χ
h
χ








−
η
1
1
2








−
−
−
ν
η
η
1
2
1
1
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
M
χ
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
3
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
m
χ
(
)
ν
η
−
−
1
1
1
η
1
1
−
(
)
χ
M
g0
(
)
χ
d
g
(
)
χ
h
χ








−
η
2
1
1
2
(
)
ν
η
−
−
1
2
1
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
d
χ
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
4
.
a
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
S
t
a
t
i
c
d
χ
η
ν
2
1
1
−
>
10
(
)
χ
d
g
(
)
χ
h
χ








−
η
2
1
1
2
(
)
ν
η
−
−
1
2
1
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
d
χ
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
4
.
b
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
1
=
S
t
a
t
i
c
d
χ
η
ν
2
1
1
−
≤0
(
)
χ
d
g
(
)
χ
h
χ








−
η
2
1
1
2
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
m
χ
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
5
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
d
χ








−
η
1
1
2
(
)
χ
m
g
(
)
ν
η
−
−
1
2
1
1








−
−
−
ν
η
η
1
2
1
1
1k
t
k
t
+
1
0
s
s
d
k
s
s
M
k
s
s
m
k
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
6
4
5
o
(
)
1
1
1
1
1
−
−
+








+
−
=
η η
η
φ
α
χ
t
M
t
k
k
(
)
1
1
1
1
1
−
−
+








+
−
=
η η
η
φ
α
χ
t
m
t
k
k
(
)
1
1
1
1
1
−
−
+








+
−
=
η η
η
φ
α
χ
t
d
t
k
k
1
−
η η
φ0
(
)
ω
D
g
(
)
ω
h
ω
η
1
1
−








−
−








−
−








−








−
−
−
η
ν
η
ν
η
η
η
η
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
D
ω
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
7
.
a
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
S
t
a
t
i
c
D
ω








−
>
−
η
ν
η
2
1
1
2
1
10
(
)
ω
D
g
(
)
ω
h
ω
η
1
1
−
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
D
ω
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
7
.
b
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
1
=
S
t
a
t
i
c
D
ω








−
>
−
η
ν
η
2
1
1
2
1








−
−








−
−








−








−
−
−
η
ν
η
ν
η
η
η
η
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
10
(
)
χ
D
g
(
)
χ
h
ω
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
M
ω
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
D
ω
(
)
χ
M
g
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
8
.
a
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
7
3
.
2
<
η0
(
)
χ
M
g
(
)
χ
h
ω
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
D
ω
1
D
y
n
a
m
i
c
M
ω
(
)
χ
D
g
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
8
.
b
C
a
s
e
 
w
h
e
r
e
7
3
.
2
>
η